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AMENDMENT 7 REFERENDUM: POWER TO THE
PEOPLE
Victor A. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
In North Little Rock v. Gorman' the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that an ordinance passed by a city council increasing the rates
charged for electricity sold by the city is a legislative measure rather
than an administrative measure and consequently is subject to ref-
erendum under amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution.2 The
court seemingly ignored cases on point from other jurisdictions :1 and
instead took a minority position on this issue of first impression in
Arkansas.
The impact of Gorman cannot be fully realized from a mere
reading of the majority opinion4 nor the somewhat more enlightened
concurring opinion.' Gorman looms as an important decision in the
* Associate with the Little Rock law firm of Hoover, Jacobs & Storey; B.A., Davidson
College, 1974; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1978. The author worked in the
North Little Rock City Attorney's office from March 1977 through September 1978, first as a
student research assistant and later as an assistant city attorney.
1. 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978).
2. Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution reserves legislative powers to the people
on both the state and municipal levels. Broadly defined, the power of initiative is the citizens'
power to place a measure on the ballot by collecting signatures on petitions favoring place-
ment of the proposal on the ballot. Conversely, the referendum power involves similar peti-
tioning action which results in having a measure placed on the ballot for the purpose of
repealing it.
In pertinent part, amendment 7 reads as follows: "The ... referendum powers of the
people are hereby further reserved to the local voters of each municipality. . . as to all local,
special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities
. .. The referendum power is invoked when "fifteen per cent of the legal voters shall
petition for [a] special election" on an ordinance. ARK. CONST. amend 7.
Not all ordinances passed by a city council are subject to referendum. To be referred an
ordinance must be legislative in character as opposed to administrative. Greenlee v. Munn,
262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978); Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
See generally 5 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 16.48-16.70 (1969 &
Supp. 1977).
3. E.g., Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 571 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1977) (ordinance raising rates for
municipally-owned water utility held not sujbect to referendum under constitutional provi-
sion similar to amendment 7); Hoover v. Carpenter, 188 Neb. 405, 197 N.W.2d 11 (1972)
(ordinance raising rates for municipally-owned electric utility held not subject to referendum
under statute reserving referendum power on "any ordinance or other measure"). These and
other cases are discussed more fully at pp. 74-75 infra.
4. See North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 153-55, 568 S.W.2d 481, 482-86
(1978).
5. Id. at 159-61, 568 S.W.2d at 486-87 (Fogleman, J., concurring).
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area of municipal law; therefore, this article will attempt an exposi-
tory analysis of the case.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
North Little Rock is authorized by statute to own and operate
an electric distribution system.6 In 1959 an ordinance was passed by
the North Little Rock City Council for the construction of exten-
sions and improvements to the city-owned electric system and the
issuance of bonds to finance the proposed changes. 7 In that ordi-
nance the city covenanted to increase electric rates whenever neces-
sary to operate the electric department and to satisfy bonded in-
debtedness." It also provided that "[a]ny surplus in the electric
revenue fund, after making full provision for the other funds herein-
above provided for, may be used at the option of the city . . .for
any lawful municipal purpose."'
Electric revenue has historically been a major source of funding
for the North Little Rock general fund.'" In the five years immedi-
ately preceding the Gorman litigation, the average portion of total
electric revenue transferred to the general fund for general munici-
pal purposes was 15.7%." The amount of total electric revenue
scheduled to be transferred in 1978 was approximately 10%, or
$2,150,000.12
Pursuant to Act 740 of 1977,' 3 the North Little Rock City Coun-
cil created a commission to operate its electric distribution system, "
giving to it near-plenary power with regard to wholesale purchases
of electricity and management of the electric department. 1 In that
ordinance, however, the council specifically retained the
'responsibility of adopting ordinances establishing rate schedules
6. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2319 (1968).
7. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 2926 (July 2, 1959).
8. Id. §§ 4, 5.
9. Id. § 12.
10. One of the exhibits introduced in the lower court litigation in chancery was a chart
which indicated the amounts of total electric revenue, total general fund revenue, and electric
revenue transferred to the general fund for each of the years 1970 to 1977, inclusive. The
percentage of total electric revenues transferred had decreased from 26.6% in 1970 to 11.5%
in 1977, although the total amount transferred had increased from $1,650,000 in 1970 to
$2,025,000 in 1977. Both the percentage and amount, however, were less in 1977 than in either
of the two immediately preceding years. See Transcript at 114, North Little Rock v. Gorman,
264 Ark. 150, 568, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gorman Transcript].
11. Id.
12. Id. at 167.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3934 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4755 (May 9, 1977).
15. Id. §§ 1, 4, 5.
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for customer classes of the North Little Rock Electric Depart-
ment." 6
Less than two months after the creation of the North Little
Rock Electric Commission, the rate for wholesale electricity pur-
chased by the city from Arkansas Power and Light Company in-
creased $1,800,000 annually. 7 The Electric Commission immedi-
ately recommended a rate increase to the city council for its retail
customers." Subsequently, the council passed Ordinance 4798,11
which increased the retail rates being charged by the city to a level
sufficient to offset the wholesale rate increase.
Pursuant to amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, 2 a
drive was begun to collect enough signatures on a petition to request
a referendum on Ordinance 4798.1 The referendum drive was suc-
cessful,2" and no challenge was made to the referendum petitions or
to the right of the petitioners to demand a referendum. A special
election was called by the city council, and the ordinance effecting
the rate increase was soundly defeated.23 Faced with the legal issue
and administrative problem of the effect of the repeal of a rate
increase, the city council, in a special meeting held less than a week
after the referendum, retroactively readopted the electric rates ex-
isting prior to enactment of Ordinance 4798.24
For the next six weeks the City operated on a severely dimin-
ished income. During this time a proposed budget was drafted based
on the assumption that the general fund would contain 30% less
money in 1978 because of the lower rates.2 1 This proposed budget
included numerous layoffs of employees and a severe funding reduc-
tion in several areas of municipal government.2 6 Believing that the
16. Id. § 8.
17. "On July 2, 1977, the Federal Power Commission approved an increase in rates for
wholesale power sold by Arkansas Power and Light Company to the City of North Little Rock
in the amount of $1.8 million annually." North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 153,
568 S.W.2d 481, 482 (1978).
18. Id.
19. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4798. (July 25, 1977). See also Gorman transcript,
supra note 10, at 163.
20. See note 2 supra.
21. See Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 6, 1977, at 16A, col. 2.
22. "Subsequently [sic] to the enactment of Ordinance Number 4798, petitions were
filed with the City Clerk requesting a referendum . North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264
Ark. 150, 153-54, 568 S.W.2d 481, 483 (1978).
23. Id. at 154, 568 S.W.2d at 483. See Arkansas Gazette, November 16, 1977, at 1A, col.
4.
24. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4824 (Nov. 21, 1977).
25. Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 173-75.
26. Id.
1979]
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electorate would be appeased if their electric rates were only raised
to the level of their neighbors in other cities, 7 the City Council
enacted Ordinance 4835 in December 1977. This ordinance adopted,
as exactly as possible, the currently existing retail rates being
charged by Arkansas Power and Light Company to consumers in
cities similar in size to North Little Rock.2
Within thirty days, referendum petitions again were filed with
a sufficient number of signatures to require a referedum on Ordi-
nance 4835 and the new rate schedules adopted therein. 5 The City
Clerk certified the petition as containing a sufficient number of
signatures.1o
II. ANATOMY OF THE LAWSUIT
A. Chancery Court Proceedings
Before the City Council had taken any action on the referen-
dum petition filed against Ordinance 4835,"1 a class action lawsuit
was filed in Pulaski County Chancery Court by certain citizens and
customers of the North Little Rock Electric Department against the
City, the Mayor and Aldermen, the North Little Rock Utilities Ac-
counting Commission, the Director of the North Little Rock Utili-
ties Accounting Department, and the City Treasurer 2 The com-
plaint, as amended, alleged that the action of the city council, in
raising the electric rates so soon after a rate increase had been
defeated by popular vote, was "capricious and dilatory and will
result in hardship to the . . . members of the class"; :  that the
27. See id. at 193, where the testimony of the alderman who had sponsored Ordinance
4835 is recorded as follows: "I got the impression that the people felt ... the rates were unfair
.... and the only way we could come up with what we felt . . . was a fair rate was to come
up with rates . . . equal to what other people in the area were paying."
28. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4835 (Dec. 27, 1977). That ordinance provided
"[tihat it is the specific intent of the City Council to adopt the Arkansas Public Service
Commission's approved rate schedule for Arkansas Power and Light Company, reflected in
Docket No. U-2762, on April 8, 1977, except as they may be modified or deleted to coincide
with the North Little Rock system." Id. § 1.
29. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 154, 568 S.W.2d 481, 483 (1978).
30. Letter from Jackie C. Neil, N. Little Rock City Clerk and Collector, to Mayor Eddie
Powell (Jan. 30, 1978).
Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution requires that "[tihe sufficiency of all local
petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the . . . city clerk . subject to review
by the Chancery Court."
31. The petitions were filed January 24; the next regular city council meeting was
scheduled for February 13; the lawsuit was filed February 2, 1978.
32. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 154 568 S.W.2d 481, 483 (1978). See
Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 2.
33. Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 4.
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amount by which the rates were increased constituted an illegal
tax; :" and that the emergency clause 5 of Ordinance 4835 was
"inadequate and gives no indication as to the existence of an emer-
gency and further, that no such emergency existed ... ":"' The
plaintiffs requested that the City be enjoined from using the money
"collected as a result of the increase until such time as a
referendum can be had";37 that the City be required "to escrow such
monies as represents said increase into an interest-bearing bank
account carrying legal interest until after the outcome of said refer-
endum"; s38 that, if the referendum were successful, the City be re-
quired to refund the amount of the increase ;3 and that the Mayor
and City Council "be ordered and directed to proceed forthwith
with a time certain for the referendum.' '40
Before the defendants (the City) answered the complaint, a
34. Id. at 23. In Arkansas the authority of a city of the first class to tax is derived from
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1042 to 1046 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Thus, if the electric rates constituted
taxation not authorized by the statutes, then it would be illegal. This issue was touched on
by the chancellor, who ruled the rates were "in effect taxation." Gorman Transcript, supra
note 10, at 143-44.
35. An ordinance with an emergency clause takes effect immediately or whenever speci-
fied in the ordinance. An ordinance without an emergency clause "cannot go into effect until
the time fixed by the council for referendums (30 to 90 days [as specified in Arkansas
Constitution amendment 7]) has expired." Arkansas Municipal League, Handbook for Ar-
kansas Municipal Officials 198 (1977). Amendment 7 provides as follows:
If it shall be necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and
safety that a measure shall become effective without delay, such necessity shall be
stated in one section, and if upon a yea and nay vote . . . two-thirds of all the
members elected to city or town councils, shall vote upon separate roll call in favor
of the measure going into immediate operation, such emergency measure shall
become effective without delay. It shall be necessary, however, to state the fact
which constitutes the emergency.
Essentially, an emergency clause "makes a finding of fact that an emergency exists in the
opinion of the city council, and hence, establishes the reason for the [ordinance] becoming
effective immediately." Arkansas Municipal League, supra, at 201. The emergency clause of
Ordinance 4835 read as follows:
The City Council is of the opinion that it is essential that the provisions of this
ordinance be implemented immediately to provide against deleting vital city serv-
ices, and to insure that all steps are taken to provide fair and just calculations for
all customers of the North Little Rock Electric Department. THEREFORE, an
emergency is declared to exist and this ordinance being essential for the protection
of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect beginning
January 1, 1978. And such new electric rates incorporated herein shall be billed
under a prorata formula to effectively provide that as near as possible, all consump-
tion of electricity from and after January 1, 1978, shall be billed at these new rates.
36. Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 24.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4-5.
40. Id. at 5.
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petition to intervene was filed by several North Little Rock police-
men and firemen.' Intervention was granted," and the intervenors
filed an answer and complaint in intervention." The intervenors'
complaint alleged "that the adoption of Ordinance No. 4835 . . .
was not an exercise by the city of its legislative authority and that,
therefore, as a matter of law, the ordinance cannot be referred to the
voters pursuant to . . . amendment 7 . . ... ,' The intervenors
prayed that the relief sought by the plaintiffs be denied, that the
ordinance be declared administrative rather than legislative, ', and
that the City be enjoined from referring the ordinance to the vot-
ers. 
4
The City demurred to the complaint47 and filed a counterclaim,
requesting a declaratory judgment as to whether Ordinance 4835
was subject to referendum." The plaintiffs filed a general denial to
the complaint in intervention" but never filed a reply to the City's
counterclaim.
A hearing was held at which testimony was taken from the
North Little Rock Mayor and the Alderman who had sponsored
Ordinance 4835.50 Testimony was also taken from the nominal plain-
tiff who purported to represent the class and from an additional
plaintiff.5' At the end of the testimony, the court ordered the attor-
neys to submit briefs.52
On April 7, 1978, a decree was rendered in which Ordinance
4835 was declared to be "legislative in nature in that it produces
revenue, separate and apart from the needs for the operation of the
electrical department in its complete operation; such aspect of Ordi-
nace No. 4835 is in effect taxation and Ordinance No. 4835 should
41. Id. at 7-9.
42. Id. at 10-11.
43. Id. at 12-15.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. at 13-14.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 20-21.
50. Id. at 150-94.
51. Id. at 194-210.
52. The court approved a briefing schedule that had previously been agreed upon by
the attorneys of record. Id. at 211-14. Eight days after this hearing, several parties filed a
motion in which they alleged that they were members of the class of plaintiffs and that the
briefing schedule approved by the court was unreasonably long in light of state law and court
rules. Id. at 29-33. Therefore, the movants requested an acceleration of the briefing schedule.
A hearing was held on the motion, and a shorter briefing schedule was approved by the court.
Id. at 215-31. Over two weeks after that hearing, the court entered an order allowing the new
movants "to act as party plaintiffs in this cause of action." Id. at 116.
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be submitted by referendum to the people.'"5:1 The Major and Alder-
men were "directed to call an election and refer Ordinance No. 4835
to the people."5 Four days later, the intervenors filed notice of
appeal.5 5 The City subsequently filed notice of appeal as well.'"
B. Circuit Court Proceedings
While the losing parties in the chancery litigation were filing
their respective notices of appeal, a mandamus"7 action was filed in
Pulaski County Circuit Court by R. E. Bruce, a tax-paying resident
voter of North Little Rock, against the Mayor and Aldermen.5s Es-
sentially, the complaint alleged that the defendants had neglected
to submit Ordinance 4835 for referendum as demanded by the filed
petitions; 51 that the plaintiff Bruce, being one of the petitioners, was
entitled to have the referendum called;"' and that mandamus was
the appropriate remedy to require the Mayor and City Council to
call a special election forthwith on the ordinance."' In its answer, the
City denied that mandamus was appropriate62 because of the pen-
dency of the Gorman appeal."'
After a hearingn4 and the submission of briefs by counsel, judg-
ment was entered for the defendants," the court finding that until
the Gorman appeal was resolved, there would be no certainty of
Bruce's right to have a writ of mandamus issued. The court stated,
however, that "in the event the Chancery court's ruling is affirmed,
the city of North Little Rock should be prepared to immediately set
53. Id. at 143-44.
54. Id. at 144.
55. Id. at 146-47.
56. Id. at 149a.
57. A writ of mandamus is a circuit court order "granted upon the petition of an
aggrieved party or the State when the public interest is affected, commanding an executive,
judicial or ministerial officer to perform an act, or omit to do an act, the performance or...
omission . . . of which is enjoined by law." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 33-102 (19621. Although the
statute, as written, purports to vest mandamus jurisdiction in chancery as well as in circuit,
this provision was held unconstitutional under article 7, sections 11 & 15, of the Arkansas
Constitution in Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d
777 (1970).
58. Bruce v. Powell, Pulaski County Circuit No. 78-2123, rev d sub nom. North Little
Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978).
59. Transcript at 2, Bruce v. Powell, rev'd sub nom. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264
Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bruce Transcript].
60. Id. at 1-2.
61. Id. at 2-3.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. Id. at 29-43.
65. Id. at 27-28.
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the election to be held within a reasonably prompt period of time.' '"1
Bruce immediately filed notice of appeal"' and then moved that the
Arkansas Supreme Court advance the case on its docket, abbreviate
the normal briefing schedule, and allow counsel to utilize typewrit-
ten briefs." The City, responding to Bruce's motion, requested both
an advanced briefing schedule and a consolidation of the chancery
appeal with the circuit appeal, based on the fact that the two cases
arose "out of the same operative facts" and that resolution of one
was dependent upon the outcome of the other. " The case was ad-
vanced on the docket, typewritten briefs were allowed, and the mo-
tion to consolidate was granted.'
III. THE APPELLATE STRUGGLE
A. The City's Argument
On appeal both the City and the intervening firemen and po-
licemen argued vigorously that rate making for a municipally owned
utility was administrative action rather than legislative action and
was therefore not subject to referendum." The City's argument was
based on several grounds.
During the month that the Gorman litigation arose, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court decided Greenlee v. Munn," in which an ordi-
nance appointing a person to a municipal civil service commission
was held to be administrative in nature and thus not subject to
referendum. 3 Citing Scroggins v. Kerr,4 the court noted that "not
all ordinances enacted by a city council [are] subject to the referen-
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id. at 25. Both the judgment and the notice of appeal were dated May 22, 1978.
68. Bruce's motion was filed with the supreme court on May 31, 1978. Normally, an
appellant may take as long as from 130 days to seven months and forty days to file his abstract
and brief. The appellee then has thirty days to file his brief, whereafter the appellant has
fifteen days to file a reply brief. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2127.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. SuP.
CT. R. 7(a), (b) & (c). Normally, briefs must be printed. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 8(a).
69. The City's response and motion to consolidate was filed with the supreme court on
June 1, 1978. There are no written rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court on the consolidation
of cases for appeal.
70. This action was taken at a hearing before the Arkansas Supreme Court on June 5,
1978. The appellants in each case were given fourteen days to file abstracts and briefs. The
appellees in turn were given seven days to file briefs. Appellants then had three days to file
reply briefs.
71. See Abstract and Brief for Appellants City of N. Little Rock at 48-66 [hereinafter
cited as City's Gorman Brief] and Abstract and Brief for Appellants Don Gilbert at 46-54,
North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978).
72. 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978).
73. Id. at 666, 559 S.W.2d at 930.
74. 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
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dum provision of amendment 7." '' Writing for a unanimous court
in Scroggins, Justice Leflar had enunciated a test for distinguishing
administrative ordinances from legislative ordinances: "The crucial
test for determing what is legislative and what is administrative is
whether the ordinance is one making a new law, or one executing a
law already in existence.""6 He further stated, that
if there is a law already enacted which authorizes the very action
provided for by a later resolution or ordinance, then there is no
right to have a referendum on the new measure. It is not a new law,
but only a procedural device for administering an old law. The
right of referendum should have been exercised when the original
measure, the enactment that put the law on the books, was newly
adopted."
In Scroggins the ordinance under consideration authorized the exe-
cution of a contract for the construction of low-rent housing, and
there were no previous ordinances or statutes authorizing this ac-
tion. Therefore, it was held to be legislative and thus subject to
referendum."5 In Greenlee, however, the court found that the
method of appointing civil service commissioners by ordinance was
authorized by state statute"9 and by a previous city ordinance."
Therefore, the ordinance was held to be administrative under the
Scroggins test and not subject to referendum." '
In Gorman the City stressed to the court the statutory authority
of North Little Rock to own and operate its electric distribution
system and sell electricity at a profit.2 The court was referred to the
75. Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 666, 559 S.W.2d 928, 929 (1978).
76. Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 143, 228 S.W.2d 995, 998 (1950).
77. Id. at 145, 228 S.W.2d at 999 (citing and discussing Burdick v. San Diego, 29 Cal.
App. 2d 565, 84 P.2d 1064 (1938), wherein a referendum was denied on an ordinance which
triggered construction of a building that had been authorized and planed in previous ordi-
nances).
78. Id. at 145-46, 228 S.W.2d at 999-1000.
79. Appointment of local civil service commissioners by ordinance is authorized in ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1601.1 (1968).
80. Pine Bluff, Ark., Ordinance 2994 (Aug. 16, 1949). In the words of Justice Fogleman,
"Ordinance No. 4591 was authorized, not only by Act 326 of 1949, but, more significantly,
by Ordinance No. 2994. Under Scroggins, the time for referendum was the time of the enact-
ment of Ordinance No. 2994, the new law, pursuant to which Ordinance No. 4591, the
procedural device, was enacted." Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 666, 559 S.W.2d 928, 930
(1978) (emphasis added).
81. Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 666, 559 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1978).
82. Authority to purchase electricity at wholesale and sell it to consumers at retail is
granted to cities by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2318 (1968). Numerous statutes authorize specific
uses for municipal utility revenues. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-3901 to 3903, -3929, -3931 to
3933 (1968), cited in City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 51. Further, cities are statutorily
19791
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ordinances which specifically authorized the city council to set rates
and to transfer surplus electric revenue to the general fund., The
City urged upon the court the Arkansas Home Rule Act" which
provides that a city "may exercise any function . . . not in conflict
with state law" over "the definition, use and control of surplus
revenues of municipally owned utilities. "'"
Furthermore, the City emphasized the loss of nearly $2,000,000
in general fund revenue which would be occasioned by the repeal of
Ordinance 4835,6 stressing in this regard the words of Justice Leflar,
that "[tlo allow [the referendum] to be invoked to annul or delay
executive conduct would destroy the efficiency necessary to the suc-
cessful administration of the business affairs of a city. 87 The ess-
ence of the argument was that to allow the voters to repeal a utility
rate increase when utility revenues were vital to managing the city
"would be to sanction a situation in which the referendum could be
invoked to frustrate the efficient management and administration
of a city."8
Several cases were cited from other jurisdictions"9 which had
authorized to use surplus utility revenues in any manner not in conflict with state law. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1043 (Cum. Supp. 1977), cited in City's Gorman Brief, supra, at 69-70.
83. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 2926 (July 2, 1959); N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance
4755 (May 9, 1977), cited in City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 51-52. The latter ordinance
should have been particularly persuasive, as it retained for the city council the authority to
set rates, discussed the necessity of "revenue to be derived from the customers of the...
electric department to be used for general municipal purposes as transfers to the . . . general
fund," and provided that the money to be designated for the general fund "may take such
form . . . as the city council deems appropriate."
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1042 to 1046 (Cum. Supp. 1977), cited in City's Gorman
Brief, supra note 71, at 69-70.
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-1043 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
86. City's Gorman Brief, supra note 1, at 57-60; see also note 10 supra.
87. Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 143, 228 S.W.2d 995, 998 (1950). A similar senti-
ment was reiterated in Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 668, 559 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1978):
"Certainly, the people in adopting Amendment 7 ... did not intend that it be so broad in
scope as to frustrate administrative action essential to efficient administration of the city's
affairs ....
88. City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 61.
89. Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 571 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1977) (ordinance raising rates for mu-
nicipally owned water utility held not subject to referendum); Hoover v. Carpenter, 188 Neb.
405, 197 N.W.2d 11 (1972) (ordinance raising rates for municipally owned electric utility held
not subject to referendum); Whitehead v. H & C Dev. Co., 204 Va. 144, 129 S.E.2d 691 (1963)
(referendum provision in city charter held inapplicable in utility rate matter), cited in City's
Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 51-57, 63-64. See also State v. St. Petersburg, 61 So. 2d 416
(Fla. 1952) (referendum not allowed on ordinance increasing sewer rates); In re Mitchell's
Petition, 44 Ill. App. 2d 361, 194 N.E.2d 560 (1963) (no initiative or referendum on water rate
ordinance); In re Norman Initiative Petitions, 534 P.2d 3 (Okla. 1975) (no initiative allowed
for adoption of rates or rate restrictions for city owned and operated utility); Haas v. Pomeroy,
50 Wash. 2d 23, 308 P.2d 684 (1957) (no referendum on water rate increase).
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held, under referendum provisions similar to amendment 7 ,"s that
rate making by a city council for a municipally owned utility was
administrative action not subject to referendum. For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court, under a nearly identical constitutional
provision and using the same test employed in Greenlee v. Munn"'
and Scroggins v. Kerr,"z held that utility rate ordinances do not
enact new law but merely execute existing law by changing an ex-
pense factor involved in operating a utility."1 Similarly, the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals focused on the fact that it is impossible
for the general public to be able to make an intelligent appraisal of
all the data involved in a rate determination and refused to allow a
referendum on a rate matter where to do so would have been to
sanction harassment of local officials in their executive duties."' The
Nebraska Supreme Court's approach was to examine six factors,
five of which it found to "point" away from "the right of referen-
dum.".1
As an additional basis for argument, the City cited Act 164 of
1977,6 which vested all rate making authority for nonmunicipally
owned public utilities in the Arkansas Public Service Commission.
The gist of this argument was that if rate making were truly legisla-
tive then it could not have been delegated to an administrative
agency by the legislature in light of the "well settled" principle of'
administrative law that "the authority to legislate cannot be dele-
gated" (emphasis in original)." The City's reliance upon Act 164
90. For example, "Referendum powers ... are. . . reserved to the. . . voters of every
city, town and municipality as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character
in or for their respective municipalities." COLO. CONST. art. 75, § 1. Compare the language of
amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution quoted in note 2, supra.
91. 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978).
92. 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
93. Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 571 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1977).
94. Whitehead v. H & C Dev. Co., 204 Va. 144, 129 S.E.2d 691 (1963).
95. Hoover v. Carpenter, 188 Neb. 405, 407-08, 197 N.W.2d 11, 13 (1972). The court
looked at
(1) the number of electors affected; (2) the existence of revenue bonds; (3) the
temporal nature of the ordinance; (4) the statutory authority of the Power Review
Board; (5) the need for expertise to determine the reasonableness of rates; and (6)
the fairness of our denying or upholding the right of referendum. Only the first
consideration points toward the right of referendum. The others point the opposite
way.
Id.
96. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-202a, -202b (Cum. Supp. 1977).
97. City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 66 (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935); Schecter Poultry Corp. V. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); McArthur v.
Smallwood, 225 Ark. 328, 281 S.W.2d 428 (1955)). The City argued that "it is manifest from
Act 164 that the essence of ratemaking is administrative rather than legislative because all
authority with respect thereto is delegated to an administrative agency." Id.
76 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:65
seemed well founded, especially in view of certain language in the
Act which completely precludes the possibility that referendum or
initiative powers can be exercised in relation to the utilities to which
the Act applies: "Cities and towns in this State shall have no au-
thority acting either through their governing bodies or by the initia-
tive of their citizens to assume or exercise any jurisdiction or author-
ity to fix and determine rates charged in Arkansas by electric, gas,
or telephone public utilities.""
The City made three main arguments on appeal. First, it con-
tended that mandamus was inappropriate because Bruce's "specific
legal right" to have the referendum called had not been estab-
lished.9 Second, the City argued that the act of setting a date for a
referendum election was discretionary in nature and that manda-
mus "is appropriate only when the . . . public body is called upon
to perform a plain and specific duty required by law and requiring
no exercise of discretion whatever and no official judgment." "', in
support of this second argument, the City cited an Arkansas case""
with strikingly similar procedural facts wherein mandamus was
sought to require a municipal governing body to call an election
which had been petitioned for, in accordance with the law. Manda-
mus in that case was denied.' 2 Third, the City contended that
98. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-202b (Cum. Supp. 1977). Given that North Little Rock was
charging the same rates as Arkansas Power and Light Company, another section of the Act
is appropos:
The General Assembly determined that the existing procedures whereby rates de-
scribed in this Act may be determined and fixed by the cities and towns of the State
of Arkansas acting through their governing bodies or by the initiative of their
citizens have resulted in a multiplicity of rate determination proceedings and for-
ums which are costly and inefficient, have created conflicts between the rates
charged in different cites and towns for the same services thus establishing unrea-
sonable preferences to certain citizens, and have discrimiriated unfairly against the
citizens of certain cities and towns to the detriment and at the expense of those
citizens and the citizens of the entire state of Arkansas.
1977 Ark. Acts 164, § 3.
99. "The party applying for a writ of mandamus 'must show a specific legal right, and
the absence of any other legal remedy to induce the court to award it. It follows, therefore,
that without such a showing the court would not be warranted in awarding the writ.' Brief
for Appellees at 8-9, Bruce v. Powell, rev'd sub nom. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark.
150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited as City's Bruce Brief] (quoting Goings v. Mills,
1 Ark. 11, 17 (1837)).
100. Id. at 10 (citing Willeford v. State, 43 Ark. 62 (1884)).
101. Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002 (1926).
102. Id. at 153-62, 279 S.W. at 1003-06. Voters had filed petitions for a recall election,
aimed at two of the city's three commissioners. In a suit filed by citizens to prevent the
election, a temporary injunction was issued to restrain the calling of the election. Upon the
advice of the city attorney, the city commissioners voted against calling the election. Immedi-
ately thereafter, the chancery proceedings were dismissed. Mandamus to force the recall
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Bruce, in the circuit court proceeding, was seeking to establish his
right to have a referendum called and not to enforce a previously
established right.'"3
B. Arguments Against The City
Both sets of appellees in Gorman and the appellant in Bruce
argued that rate making was legislative in nature."'" Reliance was
placed on a number of older cases which had in fact said in various
contexts that rate making by a municipality was legislative."'0
election was sought and granted in circuit court, it being alleged that the two commissioners
sought to be recalled had conspired in the previous chancery court action to have themselves
restrained from calling the election. The court reversed. Although it was plain to the Supreme
Court that "the chancery court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of that litigation,"
the trial court's finding that an injunction was in force and that the commissioners had been
advised by the city attorney they would be in contempt if they called the election was
accepted. The court stated
that mandamus will not lie to control an officer in the performance of a discretion-
ary act nor to control the discretion of an officer in the performance of his duty
where suchdiscretion is vested by law, but will only lie to compel an officer to
exercise his discretion where he has refused to act at all.
Id. at 160, 279 S.W. at 1005.
103. City's Bruce Brief, supra note 99, at 16. The City insisted that
[blefore a writ of mandamus may be issued, the circuit court must find that the
petitioner has a "clear and certain legal right to the relief or remedy sought by the
writ; and . . . the right to the writ must be clear, undoubted and unequivocal, so
as not to admit of any reasonable controversy."
Id. (quoting Naylor v. Goza, 232 Ark. 515, 518, 338 S.W.2d 923, 925 (1960)). The thrust of
the City's contention was that the right of Bruce to have the referendum called was not clearly
established. In support of this contention, the city set forth a condensed version of the
argument it was making as appellant from chancery court.
There were other points raised by the City as appellant from chancery, but the foregoing
text and notes essentially condense the arguments relating to the merits of the respective
lawsuits. For example, a good deal of the City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, challenged the
chancellor's ruling that the ordinance provided for "taxation." See City's Gorman Brief,
supra, at 67-77. Also, in a bizarre twist of circumstances, the City in its reply brief in Gorman
and in its Bruce Brief, supra note 99, was obliged to argue that a reversal in Gorman should
not be based on jurisdictional grounds. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 12-14, North Little
Rock v. Gorman, 262 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited as City's Reply
Brief]; City's Bruce Brief, supra, at 19-24.
104. See Brief of Appellee/Intervenors at 5-17 [hereinafter cited as Holman Gorman
Brief] and Brief for Appellees passim, North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d
481 (1978).
105. Lawrence v. Jones, 228 Ark. 1136, 1141, 313 S.W.2d 228, 231 (1958) ("Rate making
being a legislative act, unless the city council has acted arbitrarily and unreasonably ...,
there is a prima facie presumption in favor of their correctness ... ."; Carpenter v. Para-
gould, 198 Ark. 454, 461, 128 S.W.2d 980, 983-84 (1939) (ordinance authorizing construction
of sewer system and establishing sewer rates held to be "distinctly legislative"); Southern
Cities Dist. Co. v. Carter, 184 Ark. 4, 11, 44 S.W.2d 362, 365, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 525 (1931)
(in referendum context the following dictum appears: "The making of rates is an act legisla-
tive and not judicial in kind within the meaning of [amendment 7]").
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The case most nearly on point was Southern Cities Distributing
Co. v. Carter. ,o Southern Cities concerned a privately owned utility
which had requested a rate increase from the Texarkana City Coun-
cil for natural gas supplied to residents. The council granted the
increase by passage of a resolution.'17 Referendum petitions were
filed against the resolution. The measure was held to be subject to
referendum, primarily on the ground that it amounted to an en-
largement of Southern Cities' franchise.'10 Franchise enlargements
are specifically mentioned by amendment 7 as being subject to ref-
erendum.I' 9 The Southern Cities court, however, also stated that the
"making or fixing of rates is an act legislative and not judicial in
kind within the meaning of this constitutional amendment. ''"'
Addressing the Scroggins-Greenlee test, the City's opponents
argued for a narrow construction."' To expand the "scope of the
Greenlee case," they said "would require the people to refer initial
proposals on a theory that any later action is administrative in order
not to run the risk of being helpless when later expansions (or
changes) become oppressive. In order to prevent absolute chaos, the
Greenlee decision must be very narrowly construed .... .""2 The
argument was for power, power to the people, to the voters. The plea
was that the people be allowed to vote on "oppressive" matters,
106. 184 Ark. 4, 44 S.W.2d 362, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 525 (1931), cited in Holman
Gorman Brief, supra note 104, at 5.
107. Southern Cities Dist. Co. v. Carter, 184 Ark. 4, 5, 44 S.W.2d 362, 363, cert. denied,
285 U.S. 525 (1931).
108. Id. at 10-11, 44 S.W.2d at 365.
109. Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that any "extension, enlarge-
ment, grant, or conveyance of a franchise . . . whether. . by . . . ordinance, resolution or
otherwise, shall be subject to referendum . . . ." After setting forth that language the court
said "ts]uch language necessarily includes a resolution of the city council granting an in-
crease of rates to the public utility for supplying and distributing gas to the people of the
city under its contractual rights to do so, being but an extension or enlargement of its
franchise." Southern Cities Dist. Co. v. Carter, 184 Ark. 4, 10-11, 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1931).
110. Id. at 11 (citing Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Bacon v.
Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1913); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908);
Coal District Power Co. v. Booneville, 161 Ark. 638, 256 S.W. 871 (1923); Van Buren Water
Co. v. Van Buren, 152 Ark. 83, 237 S.W. 696 (1922); Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Ft. Smith
Spelter Co., 148 Ark. 260, 230 S.W. 897 (1921)). The legislative-administrative distinction was
not raised. Further, none of the cases cited by the court in support of its statement were
referendum cases; they all involved judicial review of action taken by administrative bodies.
In fact, one of the cases cited by the City, Whitehead v. H & C Dev. Co., 204 Va. 144, 129
S.E.2d 691 (1963) specifically had rejected an argument that Prentis supported the conclusion
that rate making is legislative in a referendum context. The fact pattern that gave rise to
the litigation in Southern Cities is now precluded by Act 164 of 1977 (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-
2202a, -202b (Cum. Supp. 1977)); see notes 96-98, supra.
111. Holman Gorman Brief, supra note 104, at 11-12.
112. Id.
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whether they were new laws or not: "The people have a right to
decide what they will pay for, what they are willing to pay fbr, and
how much they are willing to pay."' ":j
In a surprise move, the intervening plaintiffs-appellees from
chancery argued that the chancellor should have dismissed the
lower court proceedings sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.", Bruce,
in his appeal from circuit, used the same argument."' 5 Calling the
basic controversy "an election contest" involving mere "political
rights" as opposed to property rights, and, equating mandatory in-
junctive relief to a writ of mandamus,"' the City's opponents con-
tended that the entire lawsuit should have taken place in circuit
rather than chancery.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. The Chancery Case
The chancery appeal was dismissed "for want of jurisdic-
tion.""' 7 In so ruling, the court did not explain why an allegation of
illegal taxation in the amended chancery complaint"" did not confer
jurisdiction upon the chancery court,"9 since chancery has jurisdic-
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 17-19. The theme of this argument was three-fold: (1) Under amendment 7
of the Arkansas Constitution chancery court jurisdiction is limited to a review of the city
clerk's determination of the referendum petition's "sufficiency." There had been no challenge
in this regard; therefore, the chancery court was without jurisdiction. Id. at 17-18. (2) A
determination of whether an ordinance is subject to referendum is "an election contest," and
"chancery courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an election contest." Id. at 17 (quoting
Rich v. Walker, 237 Ark. 586, 587, 374 S.W.2d 476, 478 (1964)). (3) The relief requested in
chancery was in the nature of a mandatory injunction; a mandatory injunction under such
circumstances is tantamount to mandamus, which may not be issued by a chancery court.
Id. at 18 (citing Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d
777 (1970)).
115. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 18, 27, 28, 30, Bruce v. Powell, rev 'd sub nom.
North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. Adv. Sh. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Bruce Brief].
116. Notwithstanding the language of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 33-102 (1962), a chancery court
is without jurisdiction to issue mandamus. Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School
Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d 777 (1970). See note 57, supra.
117. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 157, 568 S.W.2d 481, 484 (1978).
118. Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 23; see note 34, supra.
119. The court did not address the City's argument that the plaintiff's allegation that
the new rates constituted illegal taxation rendered chancery jurisdiction appropriate, thus
validating a declaratory judgment on the subject matter. City's Reply Brief, supra note 103,
at 13. The court implied that the City's attorney "and counsel for plaintiffs ... recognized
the jurisdictional problem, but sought to confer jurisdictional status on the chancery court
by asking the chancery court to declare the rights of the parties" and held that the chancellor
was without jurisdiction to render the declaratory judgment because "the subject matter is
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tion to enjoin illegal tax measures. 20 In view of the fact that the
chancellor's ruling declared the rates to be "in effect taxation, '"''
the dismissal of the chancery appeal does not seem justified.
Further, the court declared that "essentially political rights as
distinguished from property rights" were involved and that the
"vindication of one's political rights must be sought in . . . circuit
court."' 2 But no explanation was offered as to why the prospective
loss to the City of nearly $2,000,000 in general fund revenue was a
mere "political right" and not a "property right.""'
B. The Circuit Case
In resolving the appeal from circuit in favor of power to the
people, the court began by quoting from amendment 7, emphasizing
that referendum powers apply to "municipal legislation of every
character.' '1 4 Relying upon Scroggins v. Kerr'2 and Greenlee v.
Munn, 12 1 the court observed that not all ordinances are "municipal
legislation" and that "the test resorted to in determining whether
any . . . ordinance is legislative or administrative is to determine
whether the proposition is one that makes a new law or . . .
[executes] a law already in existence.' 27 The court then addressed
the "privotal question": "Does Ordinance Number 4835 prescribe a
new law, policy, or plan . . . [,J or is it one that executes a law or
not cognizable in a court of equity." North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 156, 568
S.W.2d 481, 484 (1978).
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 32-106 (1962). See also Harrison v. Norton, 104 Ark. 16,148 S.W.
497 (1912), cited in City's reply Brief, supra note 103, at 13. Further, there is no question that
chancery courts can issue declaratory judgments where the declaration's subject matter is
within equity jurisdiction. Jackson v. Smith, 236 Ark. 419, 366 S.W.2d 278 (1963).
121. Gorman Transcript, supra note 10, at 144.
122. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 156, 568 S.W.2d 481, 484 (1978) (citing
Catlett v. Republican Party, 242 Ark. 283, 413 S.W.2d 651 (1967)). The facts in Catlett were
vastly different from the facts in Gorman. In Catlett a declaratory judgment was sought on
election conduct statutes. There is language in the opinion which indicates that "matters of
public taxation" should be litigated in chancery. Catlett v. Republican Party, 242 Ark. 283,
285, 413 S.W.2d 651, 653 (1967) (quoting Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002
(1926)).
123. The court said that under amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution "it is well
settled that chancery courts . . . have jurisdiction only to review the action of a . . . city
clerk in determining the sufficiency of [referendum] petitions .... " North Little Rock v.
Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 156, 568 S.W.2d 481, 484 (1978). The court stated that the sufficiency
of the petitions had not been challenged, and did not address the City's administrative-
legislative argument that the ordinance's referrability constituted a challenge to the petition.
City's Bruce Brief, supra note 99, at 20.
124. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 157, 568 S.W.2d 481, 484-85 (1978).
125. 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
126. 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978).
127. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 157, 568 S.W.2d 481, 485 (1978).
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plan already in existence?"'' 18 The court summarized the City's ar-
gument "that the history of rate making authority by the City...
dictates a finding that Ordinance Number 4835 is administrative in
nature and, therefore, is no[t] subject to the referendum provisions
of the Constitution.'"2 9
The court acknowledged the statutes which authorize a city to
own and operate an electric distribution system " and to establish
a commission to manage such a system.'" The court further ac-
knowledged the ordinance which created an electric commission for
North Little Rock and retained for the City Council the authority
to set rates.' 32 Thus, the court stated the City's argument was essen-
tially that the enactment of rates by the adoption of Ordinance 4835
"was merely the administration" of the statutes and ordinance pre-
viously mentioned.' 3
At this point the court seemed to be on the verge of ruling in
favor of the City. There had been no refutation of the points of law
argued by the City. However, Justice Howard apparently injected
some new criteria into the legislative-administrative distinguishing
test. These criteria are difficult to pinpoint in the opinion because
the reasoning is somewhat elusive.
Justice Howard stated that the City's argument was
"interesting and at first blush seems plausible," but he went on to
say that he was "not persuaded that this argument comes to grips
with an element contained in the rate making process that clearly
and unequivocally makes Ordinance No. 4835 legislative as opposed
to administrative.' 3M He described this "element" as follows:
First, the Council expressly reserved the power in Ordinance Num-
ber [4755] to enact ordinances establishing rate schedules for
electric service; and, secondly, Ordinance Number 4835 was en-
acted for the expressed purpose of producing revenue for the City's
General Fund as opposed to generating funds for the operation of
the electric department. Moreover, it has been conceded . . . that
the rate increase proposed under Ordinance Number 4835 is de-
signed to benefit the City's General Fund. Under these circum-
stances, . . . having duly complied with [amendment 7], the peo-
128. Id. at 158, 568 S.W.2d at 485.
129. Id.
130. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2318 (1968).
131. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3934 to 3938 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
132. N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4755 (May 9, 1977).
133. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 158, 568 S.W.2d 481, 485 (19781.
134. Id.
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pie . . . should be afforded an opportunity to voice their approval
or disapproval of the proposition. 3 5
The court's conclusion was that Bruce was entitled to mandamus
requiring the city council to call the election, calling the council's
duty in this regard "clearly a ministerial responsibility. ' '116
The "element" which, according to the court, the City's argu-
ment did not come to grips with but which "clearly and unequivo-
cally" categorizes an ordinance fixing electric rates as legislative
rather than administrative seems, from Justice Howard's language,
to be composed of three elements: (1) a specific reservation of au-
thority to fix rates by the city council; (2) the intent to produce
revenue for general municipal purposes as well as for electric depart-
ment operation; and (3) the intent to incorporate into the rate struc-
ture a sufficient surplus to benefit the general fund.
As to specific reservation of authority to fix rates, the fact that
the city council specifically reserved rate making power to itself in
Ordinance 4755 did not create any new authority for the council but
merely expressed its intention not to transfer the rate making au-
thority to the electric commission.' 3 But, even if it were assumed
that the ordinance did create that authority, the time for referen-
dum on that ordinance had long since expired when Ordinance 4835
was enacted effecting a rate increase. 38 In other words, when the
new set of rates was adopted, there was law already on the books
authorizing the adoption of rates by ordinance of the City Council.
The prior case law had distinctly stated that if a measure sought to
be referred was authorized by law already in effect, then such a
measure was to considered administrative and not subject to refer-
endum.' :' The court never dealt with the fact that rate making by
ordinance was in fact authorized by state law and local ordi-
nances. 40
The second and third elements listed previously are really com-
ponents of one element, that being the fact that the North Little
Rock electric rates were designed to yield a sufficient surplus so that
a significant amount of money could be transferred to the general
fund to be used for general municipal purposes. The court stated
135. Id. at 158-59, 568 S.W.2d at 485.
136. Id.
137. See N. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 4755 (May 9, 1977).
138. Ordinance 4755 was enacted May 9, 1977, and Ordinance 4835 on December 27,
1977.
139. See, e.g., Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978); Scroggins v.
Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
140. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 157, 568 S.W.2d 481, 485 (1978).
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that the determinative question in the case was whether the ordi-
nance sought to be referred prescribed new law or policy or executed
law or policy already being followed.' The court had previously
noted that the City had historically relied upon substantial amounts
of revenue from electric rates in order to fund its general budget."'
Further, there was never any refutation by the City's opponents that
the very concept of the transfer of electric department revenue to
the general fund for general municipal purposes was an integral part
of the City's financial history and authorized by the Arkansas Home
Rule Act. 4 ' The concept of this transfer, or the generation of a
surplus to facilitate it, appears to be the legislative evil which the
court was determined to let the people vote on, notwithstanding the
fact that it was authorized by law already on the books.
It is difficult to discover in the decision any new principles of
law with respect to municipal corporations vis-a-vis the citizens'
right of referendum. The result in Gorman is diametrically opposed
to cases from other jurisdictions' whose black letter concepts in
this area of law are the same as those in Arkansas. The court, how-
ever, neither cited any of these cases nor attempted to distinguish
them. Nor did the court address the City's argument regarding Act
164 of 197711 which delegated rate making authority for nonmunici-
pally owned utilities to the Arkansas Public Service Commission, an
administrative agency.
In summary, the reasoning of the majority opinion seems
largely to rest upon ipse dixit. The outcome does not seem justified
in light of the very law cited by the court as controlling. The injec-
tion of new "element" into the legislative-administrative distinction
made the difference, although this element, when analyzed, seems
to place the issue back into the purview of the previously established
judicial test which would seem to have required the opposite result.
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Fogleman filed a separate opinion, concurring on "the
narrow grounds on which the opinion is based," stating these to be
the retention by the city council of "the sole responsibility for rate
making when it turned the operation of the electrical distribution
141. Id. at 158, 568 S.W.2d at 485.
142. Id. at 153 n.2, 568 S.W.2d at 482-83 n.2.
143. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-1043 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (cities "may exercise any func-
tion .. .not in conflict with state law" over "the definition, use and control of surplus
revenues of municipally owned utilities"), cited in City's Gorman Brief, supra note 71, at 70.
144. See cases cited note 89, supra.
145. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-202a. -202b (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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system over to an independent commission" and the concession by
all "that a major objective in the rate making by ordinance was to
insure a definite surplus or profit for definite municipal pur-
poses."' 46 He agreed with the City that a municipally owned utility
may be operated for a profit and cited various statutes which
authorize different uses for the surplus income generated by
the utility.'47 Yet, without addressing the Scroggins-Greenlee
administrative-legislative distinguishing test, he adhered to the
proposition that "[rnate making for a franchised utility has always
been considered to be a legislative function" and that "[tihere is
really little difference in rate making for a municipally owned utility
operated by an independent commission."'' 48
There are two disturbing aspects of the concurring opinion. In
one portion, Justice Fogleman seemed to state that a type of subter-
fuge on the part of the City might have insulated the rate making
function against the referendum power of the people: "It seems
quite possible that the rate making process for a municipally owned
utility can be performed in a manner in which the commission con-
trolling and operating it acts administratively." '4 He suggested that
the council might limit its role to one of "reviewing or approving or
disapproving rates fixed by a commission" and surmised that in
such circumstances, "it might well be that it could be said to act
quasi-judicially.' ' 50 In setting forth these suggestions, Justice Fogle-
man did not explain why rate making, if it is truly legislative, may
be delegated by the legislature to a commission which could perform
the same function administratively. 5'
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the opinion, however, is
that it comes very close to addressing one of the City's key argu-
ments, yet fails to do so. The City had argued that rate making may
be "legislative and not judicial' ' 15 1 in the context of judicial review
and yet be administrative and not legislative in the context of the
146. North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 159-60, 568 S.W.2d 481, 486 (1978)
(Fogleman, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 160-61, 568 S.W.2d at 486 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-3901, -3931 (1968)
(authorizing payment of bonded indebtedness of certain improvement districts; authorizing
use for off-street parking facilities, sanitation facilities, hospital facilities, public park build-
ings, improvements and facilities, auditoriums, convention ceners, streets and roadways and
airport improvement facilities).
148. Id. at 160, 568 S.W.2d at 186.
149. Id. at 161, 568 S.W.2d at 486.
150. Id.
151. See cases cited note 97, supra.
152. See Southern Cities Dist. Co. v. Carter, 184 Ark. 4, 11, 44 S.W.2d 362, 365, Cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 525 (1931).
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amendment 7 referendum power. 53 Reliance was placed upon
Scroggins v. Kerr'54 which had specifically said that "the sense in
which the word 'legislation' is used in [the amendment 7] connec-
tion is not always the same as that in which it is used in other
contexts. Conduct allowed as 'legislative' in character for one pur-
pose may be deemed 'not legislative' for some other and different
purpose."'' 5 Justice Fogleman's assertion that the City Council
could have reserved to itself a quasi-judicial review function after
delegating rate making authority to a commission would have been
the ideal context in which to address that particular argument of
the City.
IV. THE AFTERMATH
In the wake of the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling, the North
Little Rock City Council set the date for the referendum as Septem-
ber 12, 1978.156 In what was to be one of the most heated political
struggles of the election year, it is ironic that no candidates were
vying for office.
Both sides began to organize. The man who brought the original
lawsuit in chancery formed a "Committee for Lower Electric
Rates." ' The Major of North Little Rock issued blanket invitations
to electric rate opponents and the citizenry at large to meet with
him so that he might explain city finances and the electric rate
structure. 58 The North Little Rock weekly newspaper emphasized
that the rates in North Little Rock were the same as in other cities,
taking the stance that there was no need for lower rates. '5
As election day drew near, the campaign intensified. On the
streets, the opposition to Ordinance 4835 carried signs and protested
their high electric bills. City officials and others in favor of the
higher rates stressed the cutback in city services that would be
necessary if the rates were rolled back. These assertions were called
"scare tactics" by the opposition, who said that the "fat" in the
city's budget should be trimmed. These and other aspects of the
153. City's Reply Brief, supra note 103, at 5-6 (citing Scroggins v. Keer, 217 Ark. 137,
144, 228 S.W.2d 995, 999 (1950)).
154. 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
155. Id. at 144, 228 S.W.2d at 999.
156. See N. Little Rock, Ark., Resolution 1549 (July 24, 1978).
157. N. Little Rock Times, July 27, 1978, at 1A, col. 1.
158. N. Little Rock Times, Aug. 17, 1978, at 1A, col. 1.
159. Editorial, Referendum Comes at a Dangerous Time, N. Little Rock Times, July
27, 1978, at 4A, col. 1.
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debate filled the newspapers daily.6 0
On September 12, 1978, the rate opponents carried the day by
a margin of 5,451 to 4,182,61 a margin which left some city officials
saying that they needed just one more referendum in order to con-
vince the voters of the soundness of their position. Nevertheless, the
time had come to revise the budget. In a few days, the council
enacted a series of budgetary decreases amounting to some $380,000
for the balance of the calendar year 1978 alone.' Included in these
measures were the layoffs of several dozen employees and the reduc-
tion of funding to various departments and agencies that were de-
pendent upon general fund revenue. 3 Among the employees termi-
nated were twenty-one school crossing guards, 4 as well as several
policemen and firemen.' 5 One fire station had to be closed. '" Eighty
percent of the budgeted funds for the parks and recreation depart-
ment were cut from the remaining three months' budget.'"7
Perhaps in response to Justice Fogleman's suggestion that dele-
gation of the rate making power would insulate the rate making
function from referendum, a plan was introduced to the council to
allow the electric commission to take over that responsibility.'" As
of this writing, however, no such plan has been adopted.
North Little Rock v. Gorman'9 looms ominous for the cities of
Arkansas which must depend on surplus utility revenue as a means
of generating revenue to run themselves. The practical effect, if the
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AMENDMENT 7 REFERENDUM
case is to be taken literally, is that everytime a rate increase is
enacted beyond the bare minimum to operate the particular utility,
it will be deemed legislation which is subject to referendum under
amendment 7.
Amendment 7 provides a means for a legislative veto of the
people's voice in this regard and specifies that measures approved
by the people may be overturned by a two-thirds vote of the city
council. 17 0 Presumably, such action on the part of the council would
put an end to a particular measure, although this was not tested in
the Gorman situation. The point, nevertheless, is that the court's
ruling seems to allow the matter of adopting rates sufficient to meet
the needs for which they are intended to become a game of political
badminton, with the rate ordinance serving as the shuttlecock. In
that Gorman construes the Constitution, more than a mere legisla-
tive act from the General Assembly is needed to overcome its im-
pact. Perhaps the delegates to the Constitutional Convention will
take the Gorman situation into account when they are drafting a
proposed successor to amendment 7.
The difficult question will probably remain unanswered: What
was the reason for the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in
Gorman? It may be speculated that the court followed somewhat of
a nationwide trend toward allowing the people to vote on measures
that involve taxation, such as California's Proposition 13 and a
recent proposal in Arkansas to do away with sales tax on food and
drugs.' 7 ' Unfortunately, the holding does not seem to be rooted in
the law which should have governed, but rather springs from Justice
Howard's new "element," which, as has been demonstrated, is
slightly elusive.
170. ARK. CONST. amend. 7.
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